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Abstract. 
The article revisits the old controversy concerning the relation of the mother's brother and 
sister's son in patrilineal societies in the light both of anthropological criticisms of the very 
notion of kinship and of evolutionary and epidemiological approaches to culture. It argues 
that the ritualized patterns of behavior that had been discussed by Radcliffe-Brown, Goody 
and others are to be explained in terms of the interaction of a variety of factors, some local 
and historical, others pertaining to general human dispositions. In particular, an evolved 
disposition to favor relatives can contribute to the development and stabilization of these 
behaviors, not by directly generating them, but by making them particularly "catchy" and 
resilient. In this way, it is possible to recognize both that cultural representations and practices 
are specific to a community at a time in its history (rather than mere tokens of a general type), 
and that they are, in essential respects, grounded in the common evolved psychology of 
human beings. 
  
One of the most discussed topics in the history of anthropology has been the significance of 
the relationship between mother's brother and sister's son in patrilineal societies. However, the 
subject seems to have entirely faded from the hot topics of the discipline since the sixties. We 
believe that, in reviewing this academic story of strange excitement and then total neglect, we 
can understand both some of the fundamental epistemological problems of anthropology and 
suggest some of the ways new approaches might throw light on questions which have been 
more often abandoned rather than resolved. 
  
The history of the mother's brother controversy. 
The behavior, which had so intrigued anthropologists, was involved with the rights, 
recognized in many unrelated patrilineal societies, of male members of the junior generation 
over the property and even the person and wives of senior male members of their mother's 
lineage, typically the mother's brother.(note 1) The example which came to be most discussed 
was that of the BaThonga of Southern Africa because of the particularly full and surprising 
description of the customs involved given by Junod, an early missionary ethnographer, in a 
famous book published in 1912 (Junod 1912). There the relation primarily concerned the right 
of mutual insult between the sister's son and the mother's brother as well as his wives and 
unclear claims to the property of the mother's brother by the sister's son. The tolerated 
violence of the behavior, as well as the sexual overtones, contributed to the fascination with 
the custom and probably titillated the various scholars who have discussed the subject. But it 
was not so much this one example which interested scholars, but the conviction that they were 
dealing with a peculiar relationship which occurred again and again in many totally unrelated 
societies, something which was all the more unexpected as it contradicted patrilineal 
organizational principles-since mother's brother and sister's sons usually must belong to 
different lineages-, and the respect usually accorded to senior generations. 
Examples of this peculiar relationship were thought to have been found among Australian 
Aborigines, in Amazonia, southern Europe, Oceania, India, not to mention other parts of 
Africa. Even today recent ethnographers have been struck, again and again, by the 
prominence accorded to this relationship by the people they have studied in many different 
places, for example: Northern India (Jamous 1991), Amazonia (Viveiros de Castro 1992), and 
Melanesia (Gillison, 1993). But this apparent recurrence itself raises a problem, a problem 
that is central to the argument of this paper. The various manifestations which so many 
anthropologists have recognized as different instances of the peculiar mother's brother/ sister's 
son relationship are clearly cognate and it is an interesting fact that, in many places in the 
world, people consider the relationship between mother's brother and sister's son as very 
special and very interesting, but these cases also turn out, on closer examination, to be very 
varied: sometimes involving symmetrical joking, sometimes asymmetrical joking, sometimes 
avoidance, sometimes significant economic privileges, sometimes sexual rights, sometimes 
only ritual manifestations, and, furthermore, while in some cases it is actual mother's brothers 
and sister's sons who have he rights in question sometimes the relation involves wide 
classificatory groups. The variation is in fact so great that it becomes very difficult to say 
exactly what thing it is which the various examples share, and this inevitably has made many 
wonder whether the many scholars who have turned their attention to the question have not 
been dealing with a non existent category. 
At first, anthropologists assuming a universal history to humankind along a single 
evolutionary path, as well as, implicitly, a universal cognitive representation of filiation and 
marriage, saw in such practices as the aggressive rights of the sister's son over his mother's 
brother's property a survival of mother right and the proof of the existence of an earlier 
matrilineal state (Rivers 1914). The explanation of the sister's son's privilege in terms of this 
alleged matrilineal stage was then famously dismissed by Radcliffe-Brown who, using his 
refutation to demonstrate the character of structural-functional accounts, supplied a 
synchronic explanation for the practice (Radcliffe-Brown 1924). Thus the controversy over 
the mother's brother could not have been more central in the short history of social 
anthropological theory and the success of Radcliffe-Brown's argument was a key element in 
the gradual marginalization of notions of evolution from the mainstreams of the subject. 
Radcliffe-Brown's explanation was, at first, mainly in terms of the "extension of sentiment" 
hypothesis. More particularly he argued that the sentiments of a child towards its mother were 
extended to the mother's family, thus the mother's brother was a kind of male mother who 
acted accordingly in a maternal fashion and so gave gifts to his sister's son. More important, 
however, was the argument that such customs could only be understood in terms of their 
function as part of the total social structure. Radcliffe-Brown's argument, therefore, not only 
went against evolutionism but also was to be a dramatic demonstration of the value of what 
has come to be known as structural-functionalism. For Radcliffe-Brown, therefore, the idea of 
an identical and single history of humankind was abandoned but a universalistic element 
remained in that he assumed a universal cognitive basis for the representation of kinship, 
mothers were always mothers and patriliny's attempt to underplay this caused problems which 
had to be resolved by strange customs. Furthermore, because of the commonality of the 
fundamental building blocks of kinship systems, large-scale comparisons could be made 
between societies, which were to be the foundations of the new "natural science of society". 
In turn, Radcliffe-Brown was criticized by Fortes and then by Goody who, while retaining the 
fundamental principle of a synchronic explanation in terms of a systematic social structure, 
criticized Radcliffe Brown's explanation for being over general, since it would predict a much 
greater degree of universality and uniformity than the evidence warranted. Goody's criticism 
takes the form of noting that, although the sentiments of children towards their mother's were 
everywhere the same, the specific practice in question was only found in certain societies with 
patrilineal descent groups without the counter balance of matrilineal inheritance and that any 
explanation must be tied to the occurrence of this type of group. Furthermore, and here 
following the later Radcliffe-Brown, he specifies the character of the institution much more 
narrowly than the earlier evolutionist writers, insisting on the element of privileged aggression 
in the snatching of property by the sister's son in ritual contexts. This strange custom he, like 
Fortes, explains in terms of the contradiction between what he argues is a universally bilateral 
kinship system and the occasionally occurring unilineal descent system. Sister's sons are 
grandchildren of their mother's father in the kinship system and are therefore their heirs while, 
in the descent system, they are in no way their successors, since descent only goes in the 
patrilineal line. This contradiction is resolved by the tolerated snatching of meat by the sister's 
son at the sacrifices of his mother's brother because, in this way, he recuperates some of his 
grandparental inheritance from the son of his maternal grandparents who has obtained 
(abusively in terms of the kinship system, but legitimately in terms of the descent system) all 
the inheritance coming from his maternal grandfather. This argument is clinched by a 
comparison of two closely related groups who vary in their property system and where the 
degree of inheritance "deprivation" of the sister's son correlates with the degree of snatching. 
This piece of work is a particularly fine example of the structural-functional analyses of its 
time. It assumes, with a characteristically confident tone, that the comparison of the social 
structure of different societies will reveal recurring connections between different features, 
which, it could then be assumed, had a form of synchronic causal relationship between them. 
This sort of comparison also implied a belief that the basic institutions of societies were 
everywhere of much the same kind, that they were represented in much the same way, that we 
knew that there were men and women in all human societies, that there was marriage and that 
there was filiation. According to this way of thinking, patriliny is a particular perspective put 
on the universally recognized facts of procreation. The belief in the universality of the basic 
representations of kinship of Radcliffe-Brown is thus modified but not abandoned since these 
representations, when they occur, are about natural, objective facts that exist independently of 
actors' representations. Furthermore, the emotional reaction to a certain state of affairs, in this 
case ambiguity over filiation, is assumed to be basically the same for all humans irrespective 
of culture and to produce, therefore, similar behaviors in similar circumstances. These 
different but related assumptions of a common ground is what made the use of comparison as 
a discovery procedure possible. Variations were significant because it could be assumed that 
they occurred within the same natural field consisting of identifiable elements, thus the 
general principles of Radcliffe-Brown's natural comparative science of society remained 
possible. 
This identity of the basic building blocks of kinship systems is precisely what came under 
challenge in the subsequent developments of the subject. The first clearly expressed 
formulation of the coming epistemological shift is to be found in Leach's 1955 paper on 
marriage (Leach 1955). This shift was emphatically repeated and expanded in the introduction 
by Needham to the ASA volume Rethinking Kinship and Marriage (Needham 1971). The 
basis of their arguments was that marriage or kinship, as understood by social and cultural 
anthropologists were not externally existing phenomena, but were merely glosses for loosely 
similar notions found in different cultures. As Needham put it, there was no such thing as 
kinship. Subsequently, in a more empirical mood, Schneider attempted to demonstrate that 
Austronesian kinship was a fundamentally different phenomenon to European notions of 
kinship and, aiming at understanding the former with the words appropriate for the latter, was 
a source of confusion (Schneider 1984). Thus, generalizing comparisons of kinship systems 
were not possible since they did not involve, as was previously assumed, comparisons of like 
with like. 
Similar in inspiration but even more startling-though to many less convincing in its extreme 
forms-was the point made by a number of feminists that there were no such things as women 
and men beyond a specific cultural context. Explicitly drawing on Schneider's critique of 
kinship, Yanagisako and Collier argued that the differentiation between female and male, that 
anthropologists had incorporated in their analyses, was a "cultural construction" and was of a 
quite different order than any sexual difference between organisms that might exist in nature 
(Collier and Yanagisako 1987). These anti naïve empiricist points had two consequences for 
the kind of argument Radcliffe-Brown, Fortes, and Goody had presented. First of all, as was 
noted above, it could be argued that the grand comparisons of structural functionalism 
involved operations like adding apples and pears and, secondly, the social units, such as 
lineages for example were not similar "natural things" occurring in different societies but 
different and unique historical/cultural representations constructed in different settings and 
therefore incommensurable (see Kuper 1982). The only reason, according to these writers, 
why kinship had seemed so similar among different human groups across the globe was 
because of an ethnocentric tendency to see similarities and forget differences. Finally, the last 
universalistic element in the Goody argument, the similarity of behavioral response in all 
humans to similar situations also came under attack by anthropologists who claimed that 
emotions too were culturally constructed (Rosaldo 1980) and could therefore not be intuited 
from introspective sympathy. 
The implication of all this for the type of comparative enterprise that Goody and others had 
been engaged in seemed clear: it made it impossible. It led, if not necessarily, at least quite 
directly to the deep relativism of much modern anthropology. The systematic comparison, 
which for the structural-functionalists was to be a first step towards scientific generalizations, 
became clearly illegitimate if there could be no assurance that the units of analyses were 
commensurate. Those who studied kinship had deluded themselves that they had been dealing 
with biological facts, which it would be reasonable to assume would be severely constrained 
by nature and therefore comparable, while in reality they had been dealing with 
representations which, it was implicitly assumed, were the product of unique histories and 
therefore could take any and every form. In the case of the particular example of the mother's 
brother controversy the recurrence of the institution which had intrigued the earlier writers 
was a mirage. Every case was different and the very terms of the relationship: mother, 
brother, sister and son did not indicate the same kind of thing in different cultural contexts. 
Thus as Structural-functionalism was successful in dealing the first blow against anthropology 
as a natural science, the culturalist attack on structural functionalism seemed to have 
destroyed any hope of attempts at generalization. We had been left with nothing but anecdotes 
about the infinity of specific situations in which human beings find themselves. 
The theoretical history we have just told can be seen as unidirectional, it is the history of the 
gradual abandonment in the belief in the possibility of anthropology as a generalizing science. 
It assumes that because human beings have the ability of transmitting information between 
individuals through symbolic communication, this frees them totally from any natural 
constrains and makes them essentially different from other animals, who can only transmit 
most, if not all, information genetically. Animals must wait for changes in their genomes for 
becoming different. Humans, on the other hand, change with their representations. The 
existence of these representations is made possible by the learning and computational 
potential of the human brain, but their contents, it is implicitly assumed, are not at all 
constrained or even influenced by genetically inherited brain "hardware". These contents are 
determined, rather, by historico-cultural processes. Human history is therefore liberated from 
biology and people may represent the world and each other as they please. The belief in the 
need for cross-cultural regularities resisting historical specificity becomes simply wrong: the 
product of a category mistake. The extension of the aims of natural science to the study of 
culture and society would be like studying smells with rulers. 
The aim of this paper is not to deny the validity of, at least, some of the criticisms of earlier 
anthropological approaches which have just been touched on. Indeed we recognize the 
relevance of their arguments and there is no doubt that the whole enterprise of the Radcliffe-
Brownian structural-functional analysis rested in part on the dubious foundations of misplaced 
naïve realism. We agree with Leach, Needham, and Schneider that phenomena, described by 
anthropologists under the label of kinship, are cultural, and therefore historical constructions 
and that people's thoughts and actions are about these constructions rather than about 
unmediated facts of biological kinship. The implicit argument, which would see 
representations of kinship, marriage and gender as merely, the inevitable recognition of "how 
things are" will not do. We will argue, however, that this does not mean that the attempt to 
invoke natural factors, or even biological factors, as explanations of such cultural 
representations must be abandoned as though these representations and the people who hold 
them have, somehow, floated free from the earth onto the immaterial clouds of history. Anti-
realism too can be utterly naïve. 
We choose the example of the mother's brother/sister's son relationship in patrilineal societies 
to demonstrate our argument, simply because it has been so critical in the history of the 
subject and we try to show that it is possible to envisage, in a case such as this, an approach 
which combines the particular with the general, even though, we must recognize that the 
actual carrying out of such a study lies beyond what we can and do do here. 
The abandonment of over-powerful theories in anthropology came, in the first place, from the 
realization that the implicit and explicit cultural "universals" of traditional anthropology were 
not as uniform as they had been assumed to be. But anthropologists who seem to argue for a 
radically relativistic constructivism, often seem to lack confidence in their own arguments. 
Their reasoning has taken them to a point that negates what all those with a reasonable 
acquaintance of the ethnographic record know. This is that the regularities, which have 
fascinated the subject since its inception, are surprisingly evident. Thus, it is a common 
experience for younger anthropologists, reared on the diet of relativism which the studies 
mentioned above exemplify, to be shocked by discovering the old chestnuts of traditional 
anthropology in their field work, just when they had been convinced that these were merely 
antique illusions. (note 2) 
The dilemma that this particular history reveals is, in fact, typical of the subject matter of 
anthropology as a whole. What happens is that, first of all, some cross-cultural regularities are 
recognized: the incest taboo, for example. These lead to quick explanations in terms of the 
evolution of culture, their "functions", either for society as a whole, or for individual well 
being, or for reproductive success. These explanations are then shown to be based on a gross 
exaggeration of the unity of the phenomena to be explained. Then explanation is abandoned 
altogether and declared impossible, leaving anthropologists, and even more the wider public 
with the feeling, that the original question has been more evaded than faced. In this way is the 
very idea of the possibility of anthropology destroyed. 
  
The epidemiological approach to representations. 
The aim of this paper is to shun such evasion and to sketch a theoretical model applied to a 
particular case, in other words to seek how a possible explanation might be framed in the case 
of a particular example of one of these "obvious" regularities, in this case the varied but 
similar peculiar relationships of the mother's brother and the sister's son in different societies. 
We want to do this without either exaggerating the unity of the phenomenon, or avoiding the 
problems discussed above concerning misplaced realism, which recent theoretical criticism 
has well illuminated. 
What is involved in explaining a cultural phenomenon? Here is a way of framing the question. 
All members of a human community are linked to one another, across time and space, by a 
flow of information. The information is about themselves, their environment, their past, their 
beliefs, their desires and fears, their skills and practices. The flow is made up of rapid and 
slow currents, narrow rivulets and large streams, confluence and divisions. All information in 
this flow is subject to distortion and decay. Most information is about some here-and-now 
situation and does not flow much beyond it. Still, some information is more stable in content 
and more widely distributed. It is shared by many or even most of members of the 
community. When anthropologist talk of culture, they refer to this widely shared information. 
What explains the existence and contents of culture in the social flow of information? An 
answer of a sort is provided by modern interpretive anthropology, which aims to show that the 
elements of a culture (or of a cultural subsystem) cohere together and constitute an integrated 
worldview (in particular Geertz 1973). This is not the approach we favor. Without denying 
the insightfulness of such interpretive scholarship and the relative systematicity of culture, we 
are among those who have argued that this systematicity is often much greater in the 
anthropologists' interpretation than in the culture itself (e.g. Leach 1954, Bloch 1977, Sperber 
1985a)-and hence is exaggerated (as is acknowledged by James Boon 1982:3-26, who speaks 
approvingly of the "exaggeration of cultures"). More importantly, even if cultures were as 
systematic as claimed, this would fall quite short of explaining the spread and stability of 
these coherent wholes, unless one takes as given that there are factors and mechanisms in the 
flow of information that somehow promote systematicity. Rather than assuming their 
existence, we favor studying the factors and mechanisms actually at work in the spread and 
stabilization of cultural phenomena and leaving here as an open question the degree and 
manner in which they may indeed promote systematicity. 
Our explanatory approach to this flow of information in society is that of the "epidemiology 
of representations" (Sperber 1985b, 1996). It is naturalistic i.e. it aims at describing and 
explaining cultural phenomena in terms of processes and mechanisms the causal powers of 
which are wholly grounded in their natural (or "material") properties. More specifically, the 
kind of naturalistic explanations of cultural phenomena we favor invokes two kinds of small 
scale processes: psychological processes within individuals, and processes of physical, 
biological, and psycho-physical interactions between individuals and their immediate 
environment (including interactions with other individuals) and that we call "ecological" 
processes. Typically, the scale of the processes invoked is much smaller than that of the 
cultural phenomena described and explained in term of these processes. It is the articulation of 
large numbers of these micro-processes that allows one to redescribe and explain cultural 
macro-phenomena. This contrast with more standard social science accounts that explain 
cultural macro-phenomena in term of other social and cultural macro-phenomena. (note 3) 
We view, then, the flow of information as a natural process occurring in the form of causal 
chains of micro-events that take place both in individual mind/brains and in the shared 
environment of the individuals involved. Inside minds, we are dealing with processes of 
perception, inference, remembering, decision, and action planning and with the mental 
representations (memories, beliefs, desires, plans) that these process deploy. In the 
environment, we are dealing with a variety of behaviors often involving artifacts, and in 
particular with the production and reception of public representations that can take the form of 
behaviors such as gesture or utterances, or of artifact such as writings. We call these 
representations "public" because, unlike mental representations, they occur not within brains, 
but in the shared environment of several people. Thus not just discourse addressed to a crowd, 
but also words whispered at someone's ear are "public" in the intended sense. Mental events 
cause public events, which in turn cause mental events, and these chains of alternating mind-
internal and mind-external events carry information from individuals to individuals. A simple 
example is provided by a folktale, where the main mental events are those of comprehension, 
remembering, recall, and speech planning, and the main public events are tellings of the tale. 
What makes a particular story a folktale is the fact that repeated sequences of these mental 
and public events succeed in distributing a stable story across a population over time. 
All these events taking place inside and outside individual minds are material events: changes 
in brain states on the one hand, changes in the immediate environment of individuals on the 
other. As material events, they possess causal powers and can be invoked as causes and 
effects in naturalistic causal explanations. They differ in this respect from the abstract 
meanings invoked in interpretive explanation (see Sperber 1985a: ch. 1). That meanings can 
be causes is contentious, and what kind of causal powers they might have, if any, is obscure 
(see Jacob 1997). For instance, attributing to a folktale a meaning that coheres with, say, basic 
values of the culture in which it is told may, in a way, "make sense" of the tale, but it does not 
come near explaining its distribution, and hence its existence as a folktale in that particular 
culture. 
It could be objected that the micro-events invoked in an epidemiological approach are at the 
level of individual minds and behaviors. How, then, can their study help explain cultural 
macro-phenomena that exist not on an individual but on a societal scale? We have already 
suggested that these macro-cultural phenomena are made up, at a microscopic level, of these 
causally linked micro-events. To this, it is sometimes objected that the vast majority of these 
micro-events cannot be observed: anthropologists will never witness more than a very small 
sample of the public micro-events involved, and mental events cannot be observed at all. 
Here, however, the comparison with medical epidemiology should help dispose of this 
objection. 
Epidemiological phenomena such as epidemics are macro-phenomena occurring at the level 
of populations, but they are made up of micro-phenomena of individual pathology and 
interindividual transmission. In most cases individual pathological processes are not directly 
observable and are known only through symptoms and tests, while the vast majority of micro-
events of disease transmission go unobserved. This, however, has been a challenge rather than 
an impediment to the development of medical epidemiology. In the epidemiology of 
representations, the situation is, if anything, better than in the epidemiology of diseases. Our 
communicative and interpretive abilities give us a great amount of fine-grained information 
about the representations we entertain and about the process they undergo, whereas pain and 
other perceptible symptoms, generally provides much coarser and hard-to-interpret 
information about our pathologies. Also, most events of cultural transmission require the 
attention of the participants, whereas pathological contagion is typically stealthy. Hence 
cultural transmission is much easier to spot and observe than disease transmission. 
In spite of the limited evidence at its disposal, medical epidemiology has provided 
outstanding causal explanations of epidemiological phenomena. It has rarely done so by 
following actual causal chains of transmission, and much more often by helping identify the 
causal factors and mechanisms at work both within and across individual organisms. Mutadis 
mutandis, the task of the epidemiology of representations is not to describe in any detail the 
actual causal chains that stabilize (or destabilize) a particular cultural representation 
(although, in some cases, it is of great historical interest to be able to do so), it is to identify 
factors and processes that help explain the existence and effect of these causal chains. For 
instance, showing that a particular folktale has an optimal structure for human memory and 
that there are recurring social situations in a given society where people are motivated to tell it 
or to have it told, helps explain why the tale is told again and again with little or no distortion 
of content in that society. 
The central question, which an epidemiological approach focuses on, is: what causes some 
representations and practices to become and remain widespread and relatively stable in 
content, in a given society, at a given time?(note 4) In so framing the question, we depart 
from the goal of generally explaining all or even most sociocultural phenomena in one and the 
same way, either as fulfilling a function (a coarse functionalist approach), or as contributing 
to reproductive success (a coarse sociobiological approach). True, from an epidemiological 
point of view, all explanations of sociocultural phenomena will have to invoke both mind-
external ecological factors linked to the transmission of cultural contents, and mind-internal 
psychological factors linked to the mental representation and processing of these contents. 
However, the particular factors at play and the way they combine vary with each case (just as, 
in medical epidemiology, a different combination of organism-internal physiological factors 
and of organism-external environmental factors characterizes each disease). 
Because of this multiplicity of co-occurring causes, we aim only at identifying some of the 
factors that contribute to explaining particular instances. These factors play a causal role only 
in specific historical and environmental circumstances and therefore can never be sufficient to 
explain fully the local cultural forms. Caused in part by the same factors, these forms have 
recognizable similarities-which we aim to help explain. On the other hand, we merely identify 
a couple of important and recurring factors among many other diverging factors: each cultural 
form in its full local specifics is therefore unique to its particular historical context. 
This, of course, is, first of all, simply to return, though more explicitly and critically, to the 
general type of multi-factorial explanations that were typical of anthropology before its recent 
relativist turn. Two things may be new, though. Rather than accepting implicitly some 
nondescript naturalism or objectivism about kinship, we appeal quite explicitly to naturalistic 
considerations about evolved, genetically transmitted, psychological predispositions. The 
result of this explicitly naturalistic account is, however, weaker in its predictive pretensions 
than the type of accounts found, for example in Goody's functionalist thesis. There the sister's 
son's privilege appeared as an almost necessary solution to a structural problem found in 
certain patrilineal societies. Similarly, this solution was to account for the particular form of 
the institution: e.g. snatching of significant property. According to our more explicitly 
naturalistic, but at the same time more modest account, there are some factors that increases 
the chances of the sister's son privilege stabilizing as a cultural form in these societies and we 
can expect, and not be disturbed by, a wide range of unaccounted variation in practices, since 
these will always be combined with many other factors and many different histories. We 
avoid, or so we hope, both the too strong explanations of functionalism, old style cultural 
evolutionism, or of sociobiology, without giving up on causal explanation either. 
A few easy examples will give an idea of the range of factors that an epidemiological 
approach would consider relevant and the complex interrelation between mind-internal and 
mind-external factors. Density of population is a mind-external factor in the stabilization of 
drumming as a means of communication. The fact that percussion sounds tend to pre-empt 
human attention is a mind-internal factor in the culturally stabilized uses of percussion 
instruments. The ability of human memory to retain more easily texts with specific prosodies 
is a mind-internal factor in the stabilization of various forms of poetry; familiarity with 
specific, historically evolved, poetic forms is a mind-internal factor in the acceptability, 
learnability and therefore chances of cultural stabilization of new poetic works. The 
effectiveness of internal combustion engines for moving vehicles is a mind-external factor 
contributing to the stabilization of the techniques involved in constructing and maintaining 
these engines; however, untutored human minds do not spontaneously or even easily acquire 
these techniques; hence the recognition of the effectiveness of internal combustion is a mind-
internal motivating factor in the setting up of appropriate institutional teaching without which 
the relevant technologies would not stabilize. Institutional teaching itself involves a complex 
articulation of mind-internal and mind-external factors. 
As these examples illustrate, both mind-external and mind-internal factors explaining cultural 
phenomena can pertain just to the natural history of the human species and its environment, or 
involve also the sociocultural history of the populations involved. On the mind-external side, 
density of population is a natural factor found in all living species but that can be modified by 
cultural factors. Demographic density has a wide variety of cultural effects, the stabilization 
of drummed communication in some low-density populations being a marginal but obvious 
illustration. On the mind-external side again, the presence in the environment of vehicles 
powered by internal combustion engines is a wholly cultural factor-which does not mean that 
it is non-natural: it is, after all, the product of evolved mental mechanisms exploiting natural 
laws-that contributes, among many other sociocultural effects, to the stabilization of the 
techniques necessary for their constructions and maintenance. On the mind-internal side, the 
tendency of human attention to be pre-empted by percussion sounds, even if it can be 
culturally modified, is basically a natural trait that humans share with other animals. The 
ability to organize knowledge in a hierarchy of concepts is typically human, and although it is 
likely to have a strong natural basis, it is certainly enhanced by language, writing, and formal 
teaching. Familiarity with specific poetic forms is a wholly cultural trait. This illustrates an 
important disanalogy, among several, between the epidemiology of diseases and the 
epidemiology of representations: culture occurs both inside and outside of minds, whereas 
diseases, qua diseases, occur only inside organisms. 
The epidemiological model therefore does not deny the complexity of the process of human 
history. It fully recognizes that culture is both in us and outside; that it is not-not even 
remotely-just a matter of human beings with genetically determined mind/brains reacting to 
diverse environments according to the dictates of their nature. But the recognition of this 
complexity and of the unique fact that humans are beings that, in a strong and important 
sense, make themselves, still leaves room for considering, inter alia, the role of factors such as 
human psychological dispositions resulting from natural evolution. However, just as cultural 
patterns are never simple phenotypic expressions of genes, they are never simple social-scale 
projections of the individual mind. Culture is not human mentation writ large. It is, rather, the 
interaction of psychological dispositions with mind-external factors in a population that can 
best explain the fitful recurrence of certain types of behaviors and norms in a whole variety of 
guises. The inability of other models to do this, an inability common in the social sciences, 
has left anthropology ill equipped to explain many of the cross cultural regularities which 
have, in the past, rightly fascinated the subject. 
A rich example of the relationship between evolved psychological dispositions, mind-external 
factors and cultural phenomena is afforded by the case of language. A common assumption in 
cognitive psychology is that humans come equipped with a language faculty. This language 
faculty is neither a language nor a disposition that generates ex nihilo a language in the 
individual; it is a disposition to acquire a specific language on the basis of external linguistic 
inputs. The disposition is assumed to work like this. Infants react differently to sounds 
patterns typical of human speech: they pay particular attention to these sounds, they analyze 
them differently from other sounds, they look for special evidence such as speaker's gaze in 
order to associate meaning to sound, they structure meaning in partly pre-formed ways, they 
test their knowledge in themselves producing speech, and generally they develop a 
competence in the language of their community. The fact that the language acquired by the 
members of a community depends on the public linguistic productions encountered in this 
community is a truism. However, the languages found in all human communities depend on 
the psychological disposition that individuals bring to the task of language acquisition. 
Generally, human languages have to be learnable on the basis of this disposition. More 
specifically, phonetic, syntactic, and semantic forms are more likely to stabilize when they are 
more easily learnable. All so-called "natural" human languages, that is languages, the 
evolution of which is essentially the output of spontaneous collective linguistic activity, will 
therefore exhibit structural features that makes them highly learnable as a first language by 
humans. 
Languages, Chinese, English, Maori, and so forth, differ because they have different histories, 
with a variety of factors such as population movements, social stratification, the presence or 
absence of writing, affecting these histories in subtle ways. However, these mind-external, 
place-and-time specific factors interact at every generation with the language faculty found in 
every human. It is this interaction that determines the relative stability and the slow 
transformation of languages and that puts limits on their variability. For a variety of 
sociohistorical reasons, topics of conversation, preferred words, socially valued patterns of 
speech, and so on, vary continuously over time in a manner such that every generation is 
presented with a somewhat different sampling of linguistic inputs, to which it reacts, in the 
acquisition process, by unconsciously bringing about minor changes to the underlying 
grammar. Generally, whereas day-to-day cultural changes in language use may introduce new 
idiosyncrasies and difficulties such as hard to pronounce borrowed words, the language 
learning disposition operating at the generational time scale pulls the mental representations 
of these inputs towards more regular and more easily remembered forms. For instance, the 
more difficult phonology of borrowed words, or the more difficult semantics of meanings 
stipulated as part of sophisticated theories are likely to be normalized by language learners in 
the direction of easier forms. This determines a slow evolution of languages that is 
constrained both by the necessity of inter-generational communication, and by the universal 
constraints of language acquisition. 
The case of language learning, therefore, illustrates how the existence of a genetically 
inherited disposition is a factor in the stabilization of cultural forms, not by directly generating 
these forms, but by causing learners to pay special attention to certain types of stimuli, and to 
use-and sometimes distort-the evidence provided by these stimuli in specific ways. This 
leaves of course room for much cultural variability. Moreover, dispositions capable of 
affecting cultural contents may be more or less rigidly constraining, the language acquisition 
device envisaged by Chomskyans being on the more constraining side. In general, cultural 
representations departing from those favored by underlying dispositions, though possible, 
don't stabilize as easily. In the absence of other stabilizing factors counterbalancing the 
dispositions (e.g. institutional support), hard to learn representations tend to get transformed 
in the process of transmission, in the direction favored by the dispositions. 
The epidemiological approach to culture provides a way of understanding the relationship 
between psychology and culture that neither denies the role of psychology, nor reduce culture 
to mind. In a nutshell, the idea is that psychological dispositions in general (whether evolved 
basic dispositions, or culturally developed dispositions) modify the probability-and only the 
probability-that representations or practices of some specific tenor will spread, stabilize, and 
maintain a cultural level of distribution. 
How might all this help explain the regularities in the relationship between mother's brother 
and sister's son in patrilineal societies that are the topic of this article? To this we now turn. 
  
Applying the theory to the mother brother/sister's son relation. 
Underlying the theories of the structural functionalists concerning the mother's brother/ 
sister's son relation in patrilineal societies is the assumption that all human beings really 
reckon kinship bilaterally. This makes the occurrence of unilineal rules to form descent 
groups something which somehow "goes against nature". Thus Fortes (Fortes 1969) 
contrasted, on the one hand, the domestic domain where relations were governed by biology 
and natural emotions, and, on the other hand, the lineage domain which was constrained by 
politico-jural considerations which conflicted with this biology. For him, therefore, the claims 
of the sister's son were a kind of reassertion of underlying bilaterally. Goody, although 
distancing himself somewhat from the Fortesian formulation, seems to imply something 
similar in that the reason why the sister's son is being "cheated" from his inheritance by the 
patrilineal rule is because in reality, he, like the maternal uncle's children, is a true descendant 
of his mother's parents. The objection to Fortes's and Goody's position, however, has been, as 
we saw, that they seemed to assume that people act in relation to genetic relations, rather than 
in terms of a very different thing, their representation of socially specified relations. But what 
if there was some indirect causal link between the social representations and genetic relations? 
Then the accusation of naïve empiricism might fall away and the Fortes/Goody argument 
might be partly reinstated. How this might be possible is what much of the rest of this paper is 
about. 
We begin by noting that support for the structural functionalist's assumption of the universal 
bilaterality of kinship seems to come from an unexpected source. This is Hamilton's neo-
Darwinian explanation of kin altruism, and its development in sociobiological theory 
(Hamilton 1964). However, this kind of theory has been rejected out of hand by most social 
and cultural anthropologists (e.g. Sahlins 1976). It is necessary to briefly outline the theory of 
kin altruism and why it has been rejected to see if, after all, it might not be used legitimately 
in favor of the kind of argument implicit in the writings of Goody and Fortes. 
The by now familiar kin altruism argument can be summarized as follows. Genealogical 
relationships in the strict biological sense exist among all organisms including humans. The 
transmission of heritable biological traits through genealogical relationships is what makes 
natural selection possible. Natural selection favors genes which have the effect, given the 
environment, of rendering more probable more replications of themselves in future 
generations. This includes genes that promote the reproduction of the organism in which they 
are located, genes that promote behaviors favorable to the survival and reproduction of 
descendants of the organism in which they are located, and also-and this is fundamental to the 
Hamilton thesis-genes that promote survival and reproduction in yet other organisms which, 
being genealogically related, are likely to carry copies of the same genes. A gene causing an 
organism to pay a cost, or even to sacrifice itself for the benefit of its lateral kin may thereby 
increase the number of copies of itself in the next generation, not through the descendants of 
the cost-paying or self-sacrificing organism (which may thereby loose its chance of 
reproducing at all), but through the descendants of the "altruistic" organism's kin who are 
likely to carry the very same gene. 
The potential contribution of "kin altruism" to what is known as "inclusive fitness" favors the 
emergence of a disposition to helpful behavior adjusted to the genealogical distance between 
the altruist and the beneficiary. For such a disposition to exert itself, the organism must have 
the possibility of discriminating kin from non-kin, and among kin, degrees of relatedness. 
This does not mean, of course, that the organism must have the conceptual resources to 
represent genealogical relatedness and its degrees precisely and as such. What it means is that, 
if the ecology is such that degree of relatedness can, at least roughly, be discriminated thanks 
to some simple criterion such as smell, appearance, or habitat, then a disposition exploiting 
this possibility may be selected for. 
The importance of the theory of kin altruism for evolutionary biology and for the 
sociobiological study of animal behavior is not in dispute. But what are its consequences, if 
any, for the study of human behavior? At first sight, this theory transposed directly to humans, 
would predict that the requirements of this altruism should, in humans, favor an instinctually 
based universal bilateral recognition of kinship. This would give a priori support for the 
structural functionalist's assumption. Here, however, is where the objections of most 
anthropologists come in. 
These objections are fundamentally two. One, the great variability in kinship systems 
throughout the globe seems unaccountable in terms of panhuman characteristics. Secondly, 
humans live in the world via their representations, and how you get from genes to 
representations or norms is just not thought through in the sociobiological literature (which 
has been criticized precisely on this ground by evolutionary psychologists; see Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992). 
The first objection means that the explanation in terms of genes is far too direct. One should 
note however that the sociobiological position not only is compatible with the recognition of 
some degree of variability, but also purports to explain it. The expression of genes is always 
contingent on environmental factors, and it may be part of the contribution of a gene to the 
fitness of the organism that it has different phenotypic expressions in different environments. 
For instance, the sex of many reptiles is determined not directly by their genes, but by the 
temperature at which eggs are incubated, females developing better, it seems, and being more 
often born in a warmer environment, and male in a colder one (Shine, Elphick, & Harlow 
1995). 
Closer to our present concern, Alexander (1979) offers an explanation of both matrilineal 
inheritance and sister's son rights in patrilineal societies in terms of uncertainty of paternity. 
An evolved disposition to favor kin should be sensitive to degrees of doubt or certainty of 
relatedness. In particular, a man's investment in his putative children should be sensitive to his 
degree of confidence that he is actually their biological father. If there are reasons why this 
degree of confidence should be low, then a man's closest relative in the next generation may 
well be his sister's children. On this basis, Alexander predicts "that a general society-wide 
lowering of confidence of paternity will lead to a society-wide prominence, or 
institutionalization, of mother's brother as an appropriate male dispenser of parental benefits" 
(1979: 172). One may accept the premise that there is an evolved disposition to favor kin that 
is sensitive to confidence in relatedness and yet doubt Alexander's conclusion, in particular 
regarding the institutionalization of matrilineal inheritance. True, there is ethnographic 
evidence showing that confidence in paternity tends, with exceptions, to be lower in 
matrilineal than in patrilineal society as the famous case of the nineteenth century Nayars 
illustrates (Gough 1959) but it is most probably even lower in societies which have neither 
matrilineal nor patrilineal descent groups (Gibson: 1986, Stack: 1983). Furthermore, a 
correlation is not sufficient to determine that there is a direct causal relationship, let alone 
what the direction of such a causal relationship might be. 
The ethnographic and historical record shows that matrilineality and patrilineality and related 
patterns of inheritance are fairly stable systems, with very rare documented examples (such as 
Barnes 1951) of a society shifting from one to the other. On the other hand, changes in sexual 
mores towards or away from greater permissiveness and associated lower confidence in 
paternity are very common and may be caused by rapidly shifting economic, demographic or 
ideological factors. It cannot be the case, then, that a lowering of confidence in paternity 
systematically, or even frequently, leads to the institutionalization of matrilineality. 
Alexander's claim, therefore, is at best unconvincing. One could, for that matter, argue that 
the greater commonness of low confidence in paternity in matrilineal society is an effect 
rather than (or as much as) a cause of the descent system. When the inheritance system is 
matrilineal, then a man knows that his heirs will be his sister's children rather than those of his 
wife. His chances of investing in his wife's children welfare may be further reduced by rules 
of separate residence of the spouses, as are often found in matrilineal societies. To the extent 
that the opportunities for a man to invest resources in his wife's children are limited, it may 
matter relatively less whether these children are biologically his own, especially if the 
counterpart of greater paternity doubts is a greater chance of having children with other men's 
wives. This fits well with the common ethnographic observation that, in most matrilineal 
societies, there is less control over the sexual fidelity of women. 
Extending Alexander's line of reasoning to the case with which we are concerned here, one 
should predict that the chances of having institutionalized privileges for the sister's son in an 
otherwise truly patrilineal system should be greater when paternity doubts are greater too (but 
not great enough to tip the system over towards matrilineality). In this case, however, there is 
no evidence that we know of showing a correlation between institutionalized privileges of 
sister's son and paternity doubts, let alone a causal link in the hypothesized direction. 
The second standard anthropological objection to a biological account means that, even if we 
accept that a disposition to Hamiltonian kin altruism is biologically advantageous and 
therefore likely to have somehow evolved, something which is clearly plausible, it is not clear 
at all what would follow regarding cultural norms of human behavior. Probably nothing 
directly and unconditionally since dispositions to behavior need not actually lead to behavior, 
let alone to culturally codified behavior; they may be offset or inhibited in indefinitely many 
ways. Moreover, assuming that a disposition is not inhibited, it still need not be reflected in a 
cultural norm. In most human society, for instance the disposition to use, in certain 
conditions, an eyebrow flash as a sign of recognition is both uninhibited and culturally 
uncodified (see Eibl-Eibelsfeld 1975). Should we then, like most cultural and social 
anthropologists simply forget about all this biological stuff and, like the theologians and 
philosophers of old, recognize that the categorical uniqueness of human beings frees them 
completely from animality? 
The epidemiological approach offers a way of avoiding this type of dismissal, yet taking into 
account what is valuable in the objections. Let us accept, as a hypothesis, that there is an 
evolved disposition to try and differentiate people in a way sensitive to their degree of 
genealogical relatedness to self.(note 5) It is most unlikely that such a disposition would be 
such as to cause the individual to seek actual genealogical information as such. It would be 
rather a disposition merely to seek whatever available information might indicate relatedness 
to self. Now, such a disposition would favor the cultural stabilization of systems of 
representation providing for such ego-centered differentiation without determining their exact 
nature. The disposition would not be the source of these representations. These would arise as 
part of the process of distribution of ideas and practices-the historical dialectic of thought and 
communications so to speak-and its interaction with the individual cognitive development of 
the members of every new generation. The epidemiological approach seeks factors explaining 
the transformation and stabilization of representations in the process of their transmission, 
including biological factors. It does not pretend, as might a classical sociobiological approach, 
that these biological factors somehow generate the representations or that culturally 
sanctioned behaviors are phenotypic expressions of genes. 
One prediction that would follow from the hypothesis we are considering is that individuals 
would tend to show interest in evidence of relatedness, whether or not culturally codified. For 
instance, if a single kinship category included full-sibling, half-sibling, and more distant 
relatives, with the same cultural norms of behavior vis-à-vis all, the prediction would be that 
individuals would nevertheless tend to differentiate both cognitively and behaviorally 
between these different types of individual falling under this common category (see for 
instance Bloch 1998). This further interest could be carried out individually, without being 
particularly culturally condoned, as we have just envisaged, or it could contribute to the 
stabilization of further cultural representations (e.g. folk-theories, tales, alternative or 
complementary terminologies for kin) drawing finer-grained distinctions than the basic 
kinship terms system. In other words, whenever representations involving classifications and 
norms which distinguish kin in terms of closeness appear amidst the babble and multiplicity 
of other representations caused either as a result of individual imaginations and 
circumstances, or through more general socio-historical circumstances, these particular 
representations will seem strangely "right", "attractive", "natural" or "obvious" to people. This 
would be the case without individuals being at all sure why these representations have these 
qualities, and even, if they gave reasons, these reasons would often be merely post hoc 
rationalizations. 
Assuming this general framework, we should make the following predictions. In unilineal 
systems where transmission of rights and goods and generally helpful behavior creates an 
inequality of treatment among individuals that are equally closely related to ego, and therefore 
goes against the predisposition in question, there should be a general, non deterministic, 
tendency to compensate for this imbalance. Norms or institutions capable of playing, in such a 
system, a compensatory role would simply stand a greater chance to stabilize than in systems 
where the imbalance did not exist in the first place. The special rights of the sister's son found 
in some patrilineal cultures could well be a case in point. 
The relationship between biological disposition and cultural norm we are envisaging in this 
case is one between a biological causal factor obviously not sufficient and maybe not 
necessary, but such as to render more probable the emergence and stabilization of norms of 
the type in question. We emphasize that this more sophisticated naturalism makes, in this 
case, weaker claims than the common-sense naturalism of anthropologists such as the cultural 
evolutionists of the nineteenth century, and Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Fortes or Goody. 
According to their common-sense naturalism, there are natural kinship facts that people are 
somehow aware of and that guide their sentiments and behaviors. This makes a strong 
universalistic claim about human cognition, emotion and behavior, which are taken to be 
neatly attuned to natural facts. If these classical claims may superficially appear misleadingly 
weaker and more acceptable than those we are tentatively considering here, it is only because 
they are made, for the most part, implicitly, whereas we have tried to spell out a possible 
naturalistic approach. 
According to the approach we are considering, there are indeed biological facts, and in 
particular genealogical relationships. These however need not be cognized as such by people. 
A predisposition to attend to reliable correlates of these relationships cognitively, emotionally 
or behaviorally, in one or several of a multiplicity of possible ways, is likely to have evolved 
in many species, including the human species. In humans, this attention to relatedness 
encounters a wealth of relevant cultural inputs. More specifically, the developing child, 
searching his or her environment for evidence of relatedness to others, finds kinship terms 
("kinship" now in the cultural rather than the biological sense), people identified as related to 
her by means of these terms, dos and don'ts relating to kinship categories, folk-theories, etc. 
Because of her evolved disposition, the child attends to this information or even seeks it, 
retains it, guides her behavior accordingly, and becomes, in turn, a transmitter of such 
information. 
At this stage we seem to be just defending a weakened, updated and explicit version of the 
implicit or less explicit naturalistic claims of Fortes and Goody regarding the mother's 
brother/sister's son relation in certain patrilineal societies. In fact, given the sweeping and 
careless way in which these claims have been dismissed, this is worth doing anyhow. We are 
defending them, however, in a way that is not contradicted by the very real uniqueness of 
each case. Furthermore, unlike sociobiologists assuming a fairly direct connection between 
genes and culture, we claim only an indirect relationship of genetically favored receptivity to 
specific information, favoring in turn the stabilization of cultural representations of a more or 
less specific tenor. 
  
Why ritualized transgression? 
From Junod to Goody, ethnographers have stressed the transgressive style in which the sister's 
son's rights are exerted. This may take many forms, from ritualized insults among the 
BaThonga to ritualized snatching of meat among the Lo Dagaba. Why should it be so? The 
general approach we are proposing might help us understand not just the recurrence of the 
recognition of the subsidiary rights of the sister's son in his mother's brother's property, but 
also of the ritualized transgressions so often involved in exerting those rights. 
From a cultural-epidemiological point of view, cultural norms (such as the norm that 
authorizes a Lo Dagaba man to snatch meat from his mother's brother) are just a kind of 
representations that are widely distributed in a population through various processes of 
transmission. What makes them norms is the fact that they represent the way things are 
required or allowed to be. In the social science literature, norms are mostly envisaged as 
causes of behaviors conforming to them. However, norms play other causal roles, which may 
be no less important than that causing conformity. In particular, norms serve to pass approval 
or blame on behaviors attributed to oneself or to others, or just on behaviors that occur very 
rarely, if at all, but the very possibility of which captures imagination and defines the limits of 
what is acceptable. In most societies, for instance, norms against cannibalism are much more 
important as a topic of narrative and conversation than as a guide for behavior. It would be 
interesting to know how much the norm permitting a sister's son to take his mother's brother's 
good in one or another ritualized way results in actual taking of goods with significant 
economic effects, as opposed to being a topic of conversation with occasional symbolic 
enactments, serving to define social roles more than to reallocate economic resources. Alas, 
the literature does not seem to offer the kind of data that would answer this question. 
Moreover, things are likely to differ in this respect across different societies and times. 
Norms are not just causes of behaviors, they are also effects of behaviors. Their spreading is 
caused by the different types of behaviors that are themselves caused in part by the norms. In 
other words, norms are cultural to the extent that they are distributed by causal chains where 
mental representations of the norms and public behaviors (including public statements of the 
norm) alternate. Again, it would be interesting to know how much a norm such as that 
permitting snatching is maintained by actual acts of snatching, and how much by statements 
of, and about the norm. 
Both universal and culture-specific factors may contribute to the acceptability and 
attractiveness of a norm and therefore to its chance of reaching, in a given socio-historical 
situation, a cultural level of distribution. Whatever the extent to which a norm permitting 
ritualized transgression causes behaviors that conform to it, the cultural stability of the norm 
is a sign of its psychological acceptability and attractiveness-which have to be explained. 
Here we propose some considerations relevant to such an explanation. 
Suppose that there is a type of behavior that, for different reasons, is simultaneously attractive 
and unattractive in the same society. As a result, there are, in that society, factors that would 
favor the stabilization of a norm approving this behavior, and other factors that would favor 
the stabilization of a norm prohibiting this behavior. In such conditions, the stabilization of 
one of the two types of norm is an obvious obstacle to the stabilization of the other, opposite 
type. 
In such a case, things can go in one of three ways. The first possibility is that indeed the 
stabilization of one norm effectively counteracts factors that would have favored the 
stabilization of the other. For instance, religious iconoclastic movements have, in different 
societies, effectively suppressed any type of image even though the receptivity to iconic 
representations, we assume, was still psychologically present and would have otherwise 
favored the cultural approval of image production. In such a case, a psychological disposition, 
although present, fails to favor any direct cultural expression. The second possibility is that 
the factors favoring opposite norms end up stabilizing some compromise norm, as when 
images are accepted and even encouraged, but only with religious themes. Then, there is a 
third possibility, where the stabilization of one norm helps the stabilization of a well-
contained, ritualized form of the opposite norm. One norm dominates but the other norm 
applies in clearly insulated circumstances. This state of affairs may actually contribute to the 
stability of the dominant norm by highlighting the exceptional character of its occasional 
violation. Thus Bloch has argued that the sexual chaos expected at certain stages of Malagasy 
royal rituals must be seen as "scene setting" for the extreme domestic order dramatized in the 
next stage (Bloch .1987). 
The behavior studied by Goody might well be such a case of a potential conflict of norms that 
results in the stabilization of two sharply contrasting cultural norms caused by very different 
factors. One is wholly dominating, in this case patrilineal descent and inheritance, while the 
other, the rights of the sister's son, takes the form or an authorized transgression with ritual 
aspects, the very transgressive character of which contributes to the stabilization of the 
dominant patrilineal norm. This suggestion is, of course, reminiscent of a line of argument, 
famously initiated by Gluckman (Gluckman 1954) and developed by the Manchester school, 
and in particular in the work of Victor Turner (Turner 1969). What, however, the 
epidemiological approach does and the Gluckman type explanation does not, is seek to 
explain the macro-cultural fact of the asymmetrical equilibrium between a dominant norm and 
its authorized, or even prescribed, transgression in terms of factors affecting the micro-
processes of cultural transmission. 
Given the stabilization of a patrilineal norm (the explanation of which is not the topic of this 
article) and the persistence of evolved psychological factors favoring investment of resources 
in all close kin, whether patrilineally or matrilineally related, we may expect individuals to be 
welcoming to expressions of these psychological factors provided that they are not 
incompatible with the patrilineal norm they have internalized. These psychological factors 
may find an expression through the informal helping by the mother's brother of his sisters 
children. Here, however, we are talking of individual attitudes rather than of a culturally 
sanctioned practice. A cultural practice that acknowledges the rights of one's sister's children 
would normally go against the patrilineal norm, and would be unlikely to stabilize (unless the 
patrilineal norm itself was in the process of destabilization). On the other hand, expressing 
interest in the sister's son/mother's brother relationship while highlighting the fact that this 
relationship does not ground normal, regular rights of sharing or inheritance is a way or 
reasserting by contrast that very patrilineal norm. More specifically, ritualized transgression 
practices of the type we are discussing here underscore the out-of-the-ordinary character of a 
sister's son rights over his mother's brother good, and thereby contribute to highlighting the 
normal character of patrilineal transmission of goods. Thus the combination of the dominant 
patrilineal norm internalized by all members of the society, and the psychological factors 
favoring all close kin render people receptive and welcoming to a norm of ritualized 
expression of sister's son rights. 
Note that the norms and practices or ritualized transgression that are likely thus to stabilize are 
"catchy" because of their psychological rather than because of their economic effects. These 
are first and foremost "symbolic" practices that need not have any significant-let alone any 
major-effect regarding the actual allocation of resources between direct and lateral 
descendants. This is a further contrast between the epidemiological account we are sketching 
here and any sociobiological account that would explain such practices in terms of their 
putative effects, through reallocation of economic resources, on social stability or biological 
fitness. 
All that we have said, of course, does not amount to a comprehensive explanation of the 
particular forms of the sister's son's privileges in any one the societies discussed by so many 
ethnographers, and it is important to understand why. There are two reasons for this-beside 
the very sketchy character of our attempt. Firstly, we have relied on the hypothesis that there 
is an evolved human disposition that is aimed at modulating behavior in a way sensitive to 
degrees of biological relatedness, but this hypothesis is based on speculation, however well-
motivated, more than on conclusive hard evidence. Secondly, we are not offering an 
explanation for such facts as why, for example, Lo Dagaba sister's sons behave in precisely 
the way they do. Indeed, we think an uni-factorial, or bi-factorial, explanation of such an 
ethnographic datum would inevitably be insufficient. Actual cultural practices, as performed 
by specific individuals at a given time, are embedded in the social historical processes that 
have distributed, stabilized and transformed cultural representations and practices in the 
population to which these individuals belong. Each of these historical flows is unique. These 
processes are influenced by many types of factors, evolved psychological predispositions 
being only one type of relevant factor. Mostly, but not exclusively, cultural processes are 
influenced by other cultural processes. People's behavior, and in particular their conformity or 
non-conformity to norms, is guided by the representations they have of the world rather than 
by the way the world simply is. People's representations are influenced in several ways by the 
phenomena they are about, but they are influenced also-and to a greater extent in most cases 
of interest to anthropologists-by other representations, and in particular culturally transmitted 
ones. 
All these difficulties and caveats do not mean that we need to abandon altogether generalizing 
explanations of the kind we have attempted here. In other words, the recognition of the value 
of the objections to kinship studies by such as Needham and Schneider need not lead to a 
denial of the relevance of general unifying causes, amongst which are some universal human 
dispositions likely to have been naturally selected in the course of evolution. Such a method, 
precisely because it sets non absolute conditions for the expression of general factors, can 
overcome the difficulty which we have highlighted at the beginning of this paper and which 
seems to have overwhelmed anthropology. Reasoning in terms of such things as evolved 
human dispositions has, all too often, produced too powerful explanations. While the refusal 
to try to explain obvious, though partial, recurrences across cultures, in the end seems 
perverse and inevitably leaves anthropological questions to be answered by others in naïve 
ways which repeat the errors which had made anthropologists stumble in the past. 
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Notes 
(note 1) In a way that is typical of the time the focus was almost exclusively on male roles. 
(note 2) Maurice Bloch remembers how, as a student, he was bored with the mother’s brother controversy and 
convinced that it was an insignificant aberration in the history of the subject but how, subsequently during field 
work in |Madagascar, he had to listen all night to a drunk endlessly repeating "I am your sister’s son and it is 
your duty to give me a drink". He then felt haunted by Radclife-Brown. 
(note 3) Of course, explaining cultural phenomena in terms of micro-interactions is not new in anthropology. See 
for instance the work of Fredrik Barth (e.g. Barth 1975, 1987) which has been a source of inspiration to the 
epidemiological approach. 
(note 4) How stable do representations have to be to count as "stable"? From the epidemiological viewpoint, 
there is no expectation that there will be a neat bipartition, among all representations that inhabit a human 
population, between individual representations that never stabilize in the community on the one hand, and 
cultural representations that are transmitted over time and social space with relatively little modification. We 
expect on the contrary to have a continuum of cases between the idiosyncratic and the widely cultural. This 
viewpoint differs quite radically from the memetic approach to culture of Richard Dawkins and others (e.g; 
Dawkins 1976, Blakemore 1999) for which memes are true replicators and other mental contents are not. One 
might wonder then when is a representation stable enough to be seen as a cultural representation? We argue, 
against that very question, that, from an anthropological point of view, representations are best viewed as more 
or less cultural depending on the width, duration and stability of their distribution. 
(note 5) Hirschfeld 1984 can be read as suggesting a similar approach, and as insisting, quite rightly, that an 
essential relatedness and not just any kind of relatedness is aimed at. On the other hand, his description of this 
kind of relatedness in terms of a ‘natural resemblance’ seems to us inadequate. 
   
